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Abstract
This paper studies the matching of workers within the rm when
the productivity of workers depends on how well they match with their
co-workers. The rm acts as a coordinating device and derives value
from this role. It is shown that a workers contribution to rm value
changes over time in a non-trivial way as co-workers are replaced by
new workers.
The paper derives optimal hiring and replacement policies, includ-
ing an optimal stopping rule, and characterizes the resulting equilib-
rium in terms of worker ows, rm output and the distribution of
rm values. Simulations of the model reveal a rich pattern of worker
turnover dynamics and their connections to the resulting rm values
distribution.
The paper stresses the role of horizontal di¤erences in worker pro-
ductivity, which are di¤erent from vertical, assortative matching issues.
It derives the rent from organizational capital, with worker complemen-
tarities playing a key role. We compare the model to match-specic
productivity models and explore the essential di¤erences, with the em-
phasis laid on worker interactions and complementarities.
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Non-Technical Summary
How does the value of the rm depend on the value of its workers?
When one considers rms that have little physical capital such as IT rms,
software development rms, investment banks and the like the neoclassical
model does not seem to provide a reasonable answer. The rm has some
value that is not manifest in physical capital. Rather, organization capital
may be a more relevant concept in this context. One aspect of the latter
form of capital is the formation of teams and this is the issue taken up
in the current paper. We ask how workers a¤ect each other in production
and how this interaction a¤ects rm value. The current paper thus o¤ers an
exploration of organizational rent.The paper studies the value of rms and
their hiring and ring decisions in an environment where the productivity of
the workers depends on how well they match with their co-workers and the
rm acts as a coordinating device. This role of the rm is what generates
value.
The paper derives optimal hiring and worker replacement policies and
characterizes the resulting equilibrium in terms of employment and the dis-
tribution of rm values. A key result is the derivation of an optimal worker
replacement strategy, based on a productivity threshold that is dened rel-
ative to the other workers. The derivation is non-trivial and underlines the
importance of worker complementarities in productivity. Thus the model
is not equivalent to one with shocks to individual workers or to job-worker
pairings.
This replacement strategy (interacted with other worker separation and
with rm exit) generates rich turnover dynamics. The resulting rm values
distribution are found to be using illustrative simulations non-normal,
with negative skewness and negative excess kurtosis. This shape reects the
fact that, as rms mature, there is a process of forming good teams on the
one hand and the e¤ects of negative separation and exit shocks on the other
hand.
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1 Introduction
How does the value of the rm depend on the value of its workers? When one
considers rms that have little physical capital such as IT rms, software
development rms, investment banks and the like the neoclassical model
does not seem to provide a reasonable answer. The rm has some value that
is not manifest in physical capital. Rather, Prescott and Visschers (1980)
organization capitalmay be a more relevant concept in this context. One
aspect of the latter form of capital, discussed in that paper, is the formation
of teams and this is the issue taken up in the current paper. We ask how
workers a¤ect each other in production and how this interaction a¤ects
rm value. Garicano and Wu (2012, p.1394) state that organizational rent
is the economic return to organizational capital...an important theme in
organizational economics that is yet to be explored. The current paper
o¤ers such an exploration.
The paper studies the value of rms and their hiring and ring decisions
in an environment where the productivity of the workers depends on how
well they match with their co-workers and the rm acts as a coordinating
device. This role of the rm is what generates value.
In the model, match quality derives from a production technology whereby
workers are randomly located on the Salop (1979) circle and depends nega-
tively on the distance between them. It is shown that a workers contribution
in a given rm changes over time in a nontrivial way as co-workers are re-
placed with new workers. The paper derives optimal hiring and replacement
policies, including an optimal stopping rule, and characterizes the resulting
equilibrium in terms of employment and the distribution of rm values.
A key result is the derivation of an optimal worker replacement strategy,
based on a productivity threshold that is dened relative to the other work-
ers. The derivation is non-trivial and underlines the importance of worker
complementarities in productivity. Thus the model is not equivalent to one
with idiosyncratic shocks to individual workers or to job-worker pairings.
1We thank Russell Cooper, Jan Eeckhout, Ricardo Lagos, Rani Spiegler and seminar
participants at various conferences and at Yale, the LSE, the Norwegian Business School,
Tel Aviv, Haifa, and IDC for helpful comments on previous versions of the paper, Tanya
Baron and Avihai Lifschitz for very useful suggestions, the UCL and LSE Departments
of Economics for their hospitality, and Tanya Baron for excellent research assistance. All
errors are our own.
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This replacement strategy, interacted with exogenous worker separation
and rm exit shocks, generates rich turnover dynamics. The resulting rm
values distribution are found to be using illustrative simulations non-
normal, with negative skewness and negative excess kurtosis. This shape
reects the fact that, as rms mature, there is a process of forming good
teams on the one hand and the e¤ects of negative separation and exit shocks
on the other hand.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we outline the model. We
describe the set up and delineate the interaction between workers. In Section
3 we derive optimal hiring and ring policy, including a stopping rule, and
study the implications for rm value. In Section 4 we allow for exogenous
worker separation. Section 5 places the model in the context of the literature.
Section 6 discusses key assumptions in light of the results. Section 7 presents
simulations of the model, exploring the mechanisms inherent in it. Section
8 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we rst describe the set-up of the rm and the production
process (2.1). We then dene worker interactions and the emerging state
variables (2.2). We subsequently provide stylized facts supporting this way
of modelling (2.3). We end the section (2.4) with a short discussion of
optimal stopping, to prepare for the optimal replacement analysis in the
next section.
2.1 The Set-Up
A rm enters the market by sinking an entry costK. The rm starts o¤with
three workers. In each period, a rm faces an exogenous exit probability.
If the rm does not exit, it can replace at most one worker. It does so by
rst ring one of the existing workers without recall, and then sampling
 from outside the rm one worker. Thus, we do not allow the rm to
compare the existing and the sampled worker and hire the more productive
one. We rationalize this by assuming that it takes a period to learn a
workers productivity. Replacing a worker is costly. Wages and productivity
distributions are time independent.
The main focus of the paper is horizontal worker heterogeneity. Thus,
although workers are identical from an ex ante perspective, the value of a
worker to a rm is random. More specically, we assume that how well
workersteam up depends on their personal characteristics, and that these
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characteristics are random at the stage at which the rm decides on whom
to hire.
A common way to model worker heterogeneity, and which we use in this
paper, is to attribute to each worker a location in a metric space, and apply
a distance measure to capture the di¤erences between the workers. In order
to ensure that workers with di¤erent locations to be equally attractive in
expected terms, we have to put restrictions on the space in which workers
are located. A common way to obtain this is to assume that a worker has
a location on a Salop (1979) circle and that workers are allocated uniformly
on the circle.2 In this case, the distribution of the distance from a worker
to a co-worker randomly placed on the circle is independent of the workers
location. Note that this is not the case if the workers are uniformly allo-
cated on a line segment, in which case a worker at the middle of the segment
on average has a shorter distance to a randomly allocated co-worker than a
worker close to the end point. More generally, in an n dimensional Euclidean
space, an n  1 dimensional sphere will also have the property that the dis-
tribution of the distance to a randomly placed co-worker will be independent
of a workers location on the sphere. However, in this case the distribution
of the distance to a randomly placed co-worker is no longer uniform. In
the discussion section we argue that a higher-dimensional sphere may be a
convenient location space if there are more than three workers.
In what follows we therefore attribute to all workers a position on a Sa-
lop circle, with their placement randomly and independently drawn from a
uniform distribution. Any new worker placement will be drawn indepen-
dently from the same distribution. Note that if two workers are close on the
circle, a third worker will either be close to or far away from both of the
workers. Hence the distances from the third, new worker, to each of the ex-
isting workers are workers are positively correlated. This seems reasonable.
The productivity of a team of workers is assumed to depend negatively on
the distance between the workers.
Let  = 11+r denote the discount factor and r the discount rate of the
rm. In the simulations below we let r include a stationary probability of
exiting the market, after which the value of the rm is zero.
2 In a two-dimensional Euclidean space, one may equivalently locate the workers along
the boundary of any simply connected set as long as distance is measured along the
boundary.
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2.2 WorkersProductivity and Interactions
We now turn to a formal description. The three workers are located on the
unit circle. The one in the middle (out of the three) is the j worker who
satises
min
j
3X
i=1
dij (1)
where dij is the distance between worker i and j, and dii = 0. We shall
dene two state variables 1; 2 as follows:
1 = min
i;j
dij (2)
2 = min
j
dkj ; k 6= i; j i; j = argmin
i;j
dij (3)
The rst state variable 1 expresses the distance between the two closest
workers. The second state variable 2 expresses the distance between the
third worker and the closest of the two others.
The following gure illustrates:
1
2
3
1 2
Figure 1: The State Variables
Every period, each worker works together with both co-workers to pro-
duce output. Output depends negatively on the distance between the work-
ers. When measuring the distance between two peripheral workers, we as-
sume that it is measured on the segment that goes through the middle man,
not the other way around the circle (even if that is shorter). Partly this is
meant to capture the structure of a team, that it needs a common ground.
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Partly it is done for convenience, as it simplies the algebraic expressions
somewhat. It is not important for the results3.
The rms total output is written as a linear additive function:
Y = ey   2(1 + 2)
We assume that wages are independent of match quality. This is consis-
tent with a competitive market where rms bid for ex ante identical workers
prior to knowing the match quality. The prots () of the rm are then given
by:
 = Y  W (4)
= ey   2(1 + 2) W
= y   2(1 + 2)
where W is the total wage bill and y is production net of wages (ey  W ).
Within a period, the rm cannot re the workers. Hence it will produce
as long as output is positive. We will assume that this is always the case.
Furthermore, the rm may want to exit the market endogenously if 1 is
su¢ ciently high. In what follows we rule this out by assumption. Below we
show that in equilibrium it will never be optimal to exit the market or halt
production after a bad draw if K > 4(1+ r)=3r. Allowing for rm exit after
a bad draw is trivial, though cumbersome, and does not add interesting new
results.
As already mentioned, the rm can replace up to one worker each period,
at a cost c, incurred in the following period. It replaces the worker who is
further away from the middle worker. The new values 01 and 
0
2 are random
draws from a distribution that depends on 1. We write (01; 
0
2) =  1.
Figure 2 illustrates, how, without loss of generality, workers 1 and 2, who
are not replaced, are situated symmetrically around the north pole:
3 In an earlier version of the paper, we assumed that the distance between the peripheral
workers were always measured along the shortest line segments. All the results still prevail.
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Figure 2: Incumbent Workers
From Figure 2 it follows that   can be characterized as follows:
1. With probability 1  31, 01 = 1 and 02  unif [1; 1 12 ]
2. With probability 21, 01  unif [0; 1] and 02 = 1
3. With probability 1, 01  unif [0; 1=2] and 02 = 1   01
Note that the transition probabilities, and hence continuation values
when replacing, are a function of 1 and thus are independent of 2. Hence
only 2 inuences continuation values in states where the rm is not re-
placing. That is, as follows from the denition of prots (equation 4), the
continuation value of inaction is a function of (1 + 2).
2.3 Microeconomic Stylized Facts
The afore-going set-up aims at capturing properties that have been found
in empirical micro-studies of team production and complementarities within
rms. To note just a few examples: Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003)
nd that teamwork benets from collaborative skills involving communica-
tion, leadership, and exibility to rotate through multiple jobs. Team pro-
duction may expand production possibilities by utilizing collaborative skills.
Turnover declined after the introduction of teams. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson
and Hitt (2002) study U.S. evidence and stress the importance of comple-
mentarities between workplace organization (and organizational changes)
and computerization. Garicano and Wu (2012) discuss how performing com-
plementary tasks leads to the formation of an homogenous team.
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A recent study, undertaken by MITs Human Dynamics Laboratory, col-
lected data from electronic badges on individual communications behavior
in teams from diverse industries. The study, reported in Pentland (2012),
stresses the huge importance of communications between members for team
productivity. In describing the results of how team members contribute to a
team as a whole, the report actually uses a diagram of a circle (see Pentland
(2012, page 64)), with the workers placed near each other contributing the
most. The ndings state that face to face interactions are the most valu-
able form of communications, much more than email and texting, thereby
emphasizing the role of physical distance.
2.4 A Detour: One-Dimensional Optimal Stopping
Before we continue, we will briey examine our model with only two workers.
Our model then collapses to an optimal stopping model as in McCall (1970).
It can also be viewed as a simplied version of the Jovanovic (1979 a,b)
model, where the entrepreneur learns the worker type after one period.4
The owner of a rm needs two workers to produce. Analogous with the
two-period case, we assume that per period output net of wages is given by
y   ". Let V (") denote the value function of the rm. After each period,
the rm decides whether it will replace one of the workers (which one is
arbitrary). If no worker is replaced, the NPV pay-o¤ from the next period
and onwards is (y   ")1+rr . It follows that
V (") = y   "+max[(y   ")1 + r
r
; (EV ("0)  c)]
where the expectation is taken with respect to "0. It is well known that
the solution of this problem is an optimal stopping rule of the form stop
replacing if "  " for some ",where " solves
y   "
r
=
EV ("0)  c
1 + r
(5)
At ", the rm is indi¤erent between replacing and keeping one of the work-
ers. If the worker is replaced, the new worker will be within the stopping
region with probability 2", and the expected distance is "=2. With the com-
plementary probability, the distance exceeds ". The expected value of the
distance is (conditioning on being outside the stopping region) is 1=4+"=2.
4Pissarides (2000, Chapter 6) studies a similar optimal stopping model.
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Inserting for V (") and manipulating gives that " solves 5
"2
r
  (1
4
  ")  c = 0 (6)
The rst term reects the expected gain from replacing in terms of lower
distances in all periods if the draw is good. The second term reects the
cost associated with a higher expected distance next period, and the last
term the pocket cost of replacement. Solving the equation gives
" =
1
2
r
 r
1
r
(4c+ r + 1)  1
!
In the next section we employ a similar logic in the more challenging and
essentially di¤erent three worker case.
3 Optimal Hiring and Firing with Worker Com-
plementarities
Our aim in this section is to derive an optimal stopping rule for worker re-
placement. With three workers, this problem is more complex than with two
workers. The reason is that the replacement depends not only on the posi-
tion of the middle man, but also on the distance between the two remaining
workers, i.e., how good they are matched. In this section we rst show that
a rms search rule can be characterized by an optimal stopping rule. Then
we derive this stopping rule. Finally, we close the model by deriving the
wage solution.
3.1 Optimal Stopping
In this subsection we show that the optimal stopping problem can be char-
acterized by a stopping rule of the form stop searching if 2  2(1).In
the next subsection we characterize this stopping rule.
5Equation (5) thus reads
y   "
r
= 2"
y   "=2
r
+ (1  2")[y   (1=4 + "=2) + (y   ")=r
1 + r
]  c
1 + r
where we again have inserted for (5) on the right-hand side. This expression simplies to
"2(1 + r)
r
  (1  2")(1
4
  "
2
)  c = 0
which simplies to equation (6).
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Note that the existence of a stopping rule of this form is not obvious. For
example, suppose we formulate the stopping rule in terms of total distance
X = 2(1 + 2) rather than in terms of 1 and 2, that is, stop if X  X
for some X > 0. Such a stopping rule cannot be optimal. To see this,
note that (i) for a given X, the pay-o¤ if stopping is independent of the
decomposition of X into 1 and 2, and (ii) the pay-o¤ if replacing for a
given X is decreasing in 1 (see below). Hence it cannot be optimal to apply
a stopping rule under which stopping depends only on total distance.
By the logic of equation (5), note that in the stopping region, we have
that
V (1 + 2) = (y   2(1 + 2))1 + r
r
(7)
Outside the stopping region, the continuation value depends only on 1.
Dene V (1)  EV (01; 02)j1 as the expected continuation value if the rm
chooses to replace. The value function in the case of replacement can then
be written as:
V (1; 2) = y   2(1 + 2) +  V (1) (8)
We start by showing an important property of the value function.
Lemma 1 V (1 +) > V (1)  21+rr
Proof. Consider replacement in two cases in which the distances between
the remaining workers are 1 and 1 +, respectively. We refer to the two
cases as the 1-case and the 1+-case, respectively. The expected pay-o¤s
only depend on the distances between the agents, and not on their exact
location on the circle. Without loss of generality, we can therefore assume
that in both cases, the two workers are located symmetrically around the
north pole, and that the draw of the new worker is the same in the two
cases. In what follows we assume that the rm in the 1 +  case follows
exactly the same replacement strategy as the rm in the 1 case (replaces the
worker on the left hemisphere whenever the optimal strategy in the 1 case
prescribes so, the same for the worker on the right hemisphere, and stops
searching after the same draws of location). We refer to it as the replication
strategy. This is clearly in the choice set of the rm. Hence if we can show
that the replication strategy gives the rm in the 1 + case a prot that
is strictly greater than V (1)  21+rr , the proof is complete.
Let n1 and 
n
1 denote the state variable in the two cases after n periods,
and let n  n1   n1. Dene n2 and n2 correspondingly. Consider rst
the case with n = 1. Let tot be dened as tot  11 + 12   11   12.
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It follows that the di¤erence in output the rst period after replacement is
equal to 2tot. There are three possibilities:
(i) The new worker is located below the workers in the 1 + case, as
in area A of Figure 3. It follows that tot = =2, and hence that the
di¤erence in per period output is .
(ii) The new worker is located between the workers in the 1 case, as in
area C of the gure. Then tot = , and the di¤erence in output is 2.
(iii) The new worker is between a worker in the 1 and the 1 + case
(on the same side), as in area B of the gure. Then tot 2 [=2;], and
the di¤erence in output is in the interval [; 2].
Hence the di¤erence in output the next period is at most 2, and with
strictly positive probability it is strictly less than 2. It follows that the
expected di¤erence in output next period is strictly less than 2. This is
a general property of replacement. Hence if we can show that n   for
all n with the replication strategy, it follows that the prot in the 1 + 
case under the replication strategy is strictly higher than V (1) 21+rr , in
which case the proof is complete.
If the rm in the 1 +  case follows the replication strategy, it will in
all future periods have either two, one or zero workers in a di¤erent location
than in the 1-case. The corresponding values for n are either  (if both
workers are in di¤erent locations), =2 (if only one of the workers is in
a di¤erent location) or 0 (if none of the workers is in a di¤erent location).
Hence n   for all n, and this completes the proof.
Figure 3: Lemma 1
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The lemma captures the essence of replacement: it makes a bad draw
less costly than without replacement, since the rm can always make a new
draw. For any 1, 2, let D(1; 2) denote the value of replacing less the
value of stopping, i.e., from equation (7) and (8),
D(1; 2)  y   2(1 + 2) +  V (1)  (y   2(1 + 2))1 + r
r
=  V (1) + 2(1 + 2)
1
r
  y1
r
(9)
Lemma 2 Consider the case in which 1 = 2 = 0. There exists a unique
 such that the rm does not replace if and only if 0  .
Proof. First, note that if 0 is su¢ ciently small, the rm will not replace.
This follows from the fact that the gain from replacing is at most 20=r,
which is smaller than the direct cost c for su¢ ciently low values of 0. Now
from equation (9) we have that
D(0; 0) =  V (0) + 40
1
r
  y1
r
From Lemma 1 it follows that the right-hand side is strictly increasing in
0. Hence the equation D(0; 0) = 0 has at most one solution. The Lemma
thus follows.
With these two lemmas in hand, we can easily prove the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 3 Existence of an optimal stopping rule: Let 1 be de-
termined as in Lemma 2. Then if 1 > 1, the rm replaces. For any 1  1
there exists a value 2(1) such that the rm will stop replacing if and only
if 2  2(1). Furthermore, 2(1) is strictly decreasing in 1:
Proof. Since D(1; 2) is strictly increasing in both arguments, it follows
from Lemma 2 that the rm does not replace 1  2  1, while it does
replace if 1  1  2, with one of the inequalities being strict. Hence it
is su¢ cient to show that for any 1  1, there exists a unique 2(1) such
that the rm stops replacing if and only if 2  2(1) (where 2(1) may
be equal to 12   1 in which case the rm never replaces). However, this
follows directly from the fact that D is increasing in 2.
The optimal stopping is implicitly dened by the equation D(1; 2) = 0.
Since D is strictly increasing in both argument, it follows that 2(1) is
strictly decreasing in 1.
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The nding that 2(1) is strictly decreasing in 1 deserves a comment.
At 1 = 1, 2(
) = 1. As 1 decreases below 

1, 2(1) increases above 

1.
This rules out the possibility of a non-monotonicity in stopping behaviour,
in the sense that a good draw that reduces 1 makes the rm more choosy
and induces it to replace more. Appendix A shows the full derivation of :
As will become clear below, a rm will replace for large values of 1
provided that r and c are not too big.
3.2 Characterizing the Stopping Rule
In this section we will characterize 2(1). Now
V (1; 2) = (1; 2) + max[V (1; 2); V (1)  c] (10)
= y   2(1 + 2) + max[y   2(1 + 2)
r
;
V (1)  c
1 + r
]
It follows directly from proposition 4 in Stokey and Lucas (1989, p.522)
that the value function exists. By denition the optimal stopping rule must
satisfy
V (1; 2(1)) = V (1)  c
Or (from equation ( 10))
y   2(1 + 2(1))
r
=
V (1)  c
1 + r
(11)
Let Ejx denote the expectation conditional on x. Intuitively, the expected
value of replacement, V (1) , is given by:
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V (1) = y   2  Ej1
 
01 + 
0
2
| {z }
(1) : expected ow output
after replacement
(12)
+ Pr(02  2(01))| {z }
(2) : probability of
stopping
 y   2  E
j1;022(01)(01 + 
0
2)
r| {z }
(3) : expected discounted value
if stopped after replacement
+
+ Pr(02 > 2(1))| {z }
(4) : probability of
replacing again
 V (1)  c
1 + r| {z }
(5) : expected discounted value
if replacing again
There are two important points about this equation:
(i) The probability of stopping (2) includes the possibility that the small-
est distance 1 has changed to 01, and the expected value if stopped (3) takes
this into account.
(ii) The probability of replacing again (4) and the expected discounted
value if replacing again (5) build on the fact that repeated replacement can
occur when the smallest distance between the workers remained the same
(follows from Lemma 1 in the previous section).
We will show that equation (12) can be expressed as
V (1) = y   (1
2
+ 1) (13)
+
(1 + 22)y   22(21 + 2)  221
r
+(1  1   22)V (1)  c
1 + r
1. First we show that expected ow output (1) from equation 12 is
y   2  Ej1  01 + 02 = y  (12 + 1 + 212 ). Consider Figure 2. The following
is true:
 With probability 2 

1
2   12

the new worker falls outside the arc
between the two incumbents (to the left or to the right), and the
expected sum of distances between all workers in this case will be
2

1 +
1
2 

1
2   12

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 With probability 1 the new worker will fall between the two incum-
bents, and the total sum of distances between all workers will be 21
Summing up, the total expected sum of distances between all workers
after replacement is:
2  Ej1  01 + 02 = 2  12   12

 2 

1 +
1
2


1
2
  1
2

+ 1  21 =
=
1
2
+ 1 +
21
2
2. Then we show that the probability of stopping (2) and the expected
discounted value if stopped (3) in equation 12 above is:
Pr(02  2(01))
y   2  Ej1;022(01)(01 + 02)
r
=
(1 + 22)y   22(21 + 2)  221
r
 With probability 1 the new worker will fall between the two incum-
bents, in which case the rm will stop. The total sum of distances
between the workers in this case will be 21. The expected discounted
value in this case will be y 21r
 With probability 22 the new worker falls outside the two incumbents
and below the threshold, and the rm will stop. The expected distance
between the new worker and the closest incumbent is 22 , so that the
expected total sum of distances between the workers in this case will
be 2 

1 +
2
2

:The expected discounted value in this case will be
y 21 2
r
Summing up:
Pr(02  2(01)) 
y   2  Ej1;022(01)(01 + 02)
r
= 1  y   21
r
+ 22  y   21   2
r
=
(1 + 22)y   22(21 + 2)  221
r
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3. Finally we show that
Pr(02 > 2(1))
V (1)  c
1 + r
= (1  1   22)V (1)  c
1 + r
This comes from the fact that with probability (1 1 22) the new worker
is above the 2 threshold. The rm will keep replacing and pay the cost c
again.
We have thus fully derived equation (13).
Let us write:
(1 + 22)y   22(21 + 2)  221
= (1 + 22)(y   2(1 + 2)) + 222 + 212
Hence we can re-write (13) as follows:
V (1) = y   (1
2
+ 1 +
21
2
) (14)
+
(1 + 22)(y   2(1 + 2)) + 222 + 212
r
+(1  1   22)V (1)  c
1 + r
Substituting out V (1) and using (11), gives the rule (see Appendix B for
details):
c+
1
2
+
21
2
  1   22 = 212 + 2
2
2
r
(15)
This cut-o¤ rule has a very intuitive interpretation:
The LHS of (15) represents net costs of replacing, evaluated at the
threshold (2). If not replacing the worker, the total distance is given by
2(1+ 2):When replacing the worker, the rm expects to have a distance
of 12 + 1 +
21
2 ;(see derivation of equation 13 above). The rm pays c when
replacing the worker. So the net costs are c+ the expected total distance
with replacement less the total distance without replacement. The net costs
are thus
c+
1
2
+
21
2
+ 1   2(1 + 2) = c+ 1
2
+
21
2
  1   22
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which is the LHS of (15).
The RHS of (15) represents the gains from replacement associated with
lower costs in all future periods if the draw is good.
With probability 1 the new worker will be between the two existing
workers who have a distance of 1 between them. The total distance between
the three workers is 21: Existing total distance is 2(1+2), and the savings
in distance is thus 22. Multiplying this with the probability of the event; 1,
gives the rst term in the nominator of the RHS of (15).
With probability 22 the worker is not between the existing workers but
within a distance of 2 from one of them. The expected distance of the
new worker to the nearest existing worker is 2=2 and to the other existing
worker it is 1 + 2=2. The per period cost savings is thus
2(1 + 2)  [1 + 2
2
+ (1 +
2
2
)] = 2
Multiplying this with the probability of the event 22 gives the second term
of the RHS of (15).
We see from equation (15) that an increase in 1 reduces the net cost of
replacing (reduces the left-hand side) and increases the gain of replacement
(the right-hand side) This means that the higher is 1 the worse is the team
and the more the rm is willing to replace. Thus 2(1) is declining, as
shown previously. The intuition for optimal behavior is simple. The gain
from replacing is higher the higher is 1 (for a given 2), as the higher is
the probability that an improvement will take place, and the higher is the
expected gain given that an improvement takes place.
3.3 Turnover Dynamics With Optimal Stopping
The following gure illustrates this optimal behavior:
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Figure 4: Optimal Policy
The space of the gure is that of the two state variables, 1 and 2: The
feasible region is above the 45 degree as 2  1 by denition. The downward
sloping line shows the optimal replacement threshold 2 as a function of 1:
With the replacement of a worker, the rm may move up and down a
vertical line for any given value of 1 (such as movement between A, B and
C or between D, E and F). If the replacement implies a lower value of 1,
this vertical line moves to the left. This is what happens till the rm gets
into the absorbing state of no further replacement in the shaded triangle
formed by the 1 = 2(

1) point, the intersection of 2(1) line with the
vertical axis, and the origin (1 = 2 = 0).
The following properties of turnover dynamics emerge from this gure
and analysis:
(i) At the NE part of the 1  2 space, 1; 2 are relatively high, output
is low, and the rm value is low. Hence the rm keeps replacing and there is
high turnover. Note that some workers may stay for more than one period in
the rm when in this region. The dynamics are leftwards, with 1 declining,
but 2 may move up and down.
(ii) Above the 2(1) threshold, left of 1, newcomers may still be re-
placed, but veteran workers are kept.
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(iii) In the stopping region there is concentration at a location which is
random, with a avor of New Economic Geography agglomeration models.
Thus rms specialize in the sense of having similar workers. There is no
turnover, and output and rm values are high.
(iv) Policy may a¤ect the regions in 1  2 space via its e¤ect on c: The
discount rate a¤ects the regions as well.
(v) These replacement dynamics imply that the degree of complemen-
tarity between existing workers may change. This feature is unlike the con-
tributions to the match of the agents in the assortative matching literature,
where they are of xed types.
3.4 Closing the Model
Our main purpose in this paper is to study replacement, and this can be
done in partial equilibrium. Still, for completeness we demonstrate how the
model can be closed by endogenizing the wage w and pin it down by a free
entry condition. There are costs K  3c to open a rm. A zero prot
condition pins down the wage (w = W3 ):
Ej12V (1; 2;w; ey; c) = K (16)
As we have seen, the hiring rule is independent of w (since it is independent of
y). If y is su¢ ciently large relative toK, we know that Ej12V (1; 2;w; ey; c) >
K, and there exists a wage w that satises (16). A formal proof of existence,
as well as su¢ cient conditions on the parameters that ensure existence and
production in each period, is given in Appendix C.
4 Exogenous Replacement
We now allow, with probability , for one worker to be thrown out of the
relationship at the end of every period. If the worker is thrown out, the rm
is forced to search in the next period.6 Thus, if the replacement shock hits,
one of the workers, chosen at random, has to be replaced. The rm can
only hire one worker in any period, and hence will not voluntarily replace a
second worker if hit by a replacement shock. If the shock does not hit, the
rm may choose to replace one of its workers or not.
6With minor adjustments of the model, replacement can be interpreted as a change of
position on the circle of one worker, due to learning to work better with other workers or,
the opposite, the souringof relations.
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Suppose one worker is replaced by the rm as above. The transition
probability for (1; 2) was denoted by  (1), and depends only on 1. We
refer to this as the basic transition probability.
The forced transition probabilities are the transition probabilities which
occur when one worker is forced to leave, to be denoted by  F (1; 2). Which
of the three incumbent workers leaves is random: with probability 1=3 the
least well located worker leaves, in which case the transition probability is
 (1); with probability 1=3, the second best located worker leaves, in which
case the transition probability is  (2); with probability 1=3, the best located
worker leaves, in which case the distance between the two remaining workers
is min[1+ 2; 1  1  2]. It follows that the forced transition probabilities
can be written as
 F (1; 2) =
1
3
 (1) +
1
3
 (2) +
1
3
 (min[1 + 2; 1  1   2]) (17)
With exogenous replacement, the probability distributions for 01 and 
0
2
depend on both 1 and 2, not just 1 as above. The Bellman equation
reads:
V (1; 2) = (1; 2) + [E
 F V1(
0
1; 
0
2)  c] (18)
+(1  )max[V (1; 2); V (1)  c]
The rst term in the bracket shows the expected NPV of the rm if the
rm is hit by a replacement shock. The second term in the bracket shows
the expected NPV if the rm is not hit by a replacement shock. It follows
directly from Proposition 4 in Stokey and Lucas (1989, p. 522) that the
value function exists. Furthermore, due to continuity, we know that the
optimal replacement strategy can be characterized by an optimal stopping
rule provided that  is small.
5 The Model in the Context of the Literature
The paper bears (limited) similarity to Kremers (1993) O-ring production
function model. The similarity pertains to the importance attributed to the
idea of workers working well together. In that model rms employ workers
of the same skill and pay them the same wage. In this set-up quantity
cannot substitute for quality. But the models di¤er in their treatment of the
matching of workers: in Kremer (1993) there is a multiplicative production
function in workers/tasks and this underlies their complementarity. In the
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current paper there is explicit modelling of the match between workers,
formalized as random state variables, which realization elicits the rms
optimal worker replacement policy.
The paper stresses the role of horizontal di¤erences in worker produc-
tivity, as opposed to vertical, assortative matching issues. The literature on
the latter see the prominent contributions by Eeckhout and Kircher (2010,
2011), Shimer and Smith (2000), and Teulings and Gautier (2004)), and the
overview by Chade, Eeckhout, and Smith (2016) deals with the matching
of workers of di¤erent types. Key importance is given to the vertical or hier-
archical ranking of types. These models are dened by assumptions on the
information available to agents about types, the transfer of utility among
workers (or other mating agents), and the particular specication of com-
plementarity in production (such as supermodularity of the joint production
function). In the current paper, workers are ex-ante homogenous, there is
no prior knowledge about their complementarity with other workers before
joining the rm, and there are no direct transfers between them. In simi-
lar vein, the models of Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), whereby agents organize production by match-
ing with others in knowledge hierarchies, stresses the vertical dimension of
worker communication. In terms of those models, the current paper is rel-
evant for the modelling of team formation at a particular hierarchical level.
Thus these approaches are complementary to ours.
The paper has points of contact with papers in the search literature.
We exploit the idea of optimal stopping, as in McCall (1970) and the rich
strand of search literature which followed (see McCall and McCall (2008), in
particular chapters 3 and 4, for a comprehensive treatment). The existing
literature does not cater, however, for the key issue examined here, namely
that of worker complementarities. Conceptually this is an important distinc-
tion, and it allows us to analyze team formation in detail. Technically it also
gives rise to new challenges. Total match quality (or output) depends on
two variables that are stochastic ex ante, the distances from the best placed
worker to each of her two co-workers. At the same time the rm replaces
only one worker at a time. This creates a new dimension to the optimal
stopping problem, which, in contrast to most earlier studies, now depends
on a state variable (the distance between the two closest workers who are
not replaced in a given round). Furthermore, optimal stopping behaviour
depends on this state variable in a non-trivial way, and it is not even obvious
from the outset that a simple optimal stopping rule exists.
Our paper shares some features with the search model of Jovanovic (1979
a,b): there is heterogeneity in match productivity and imperfect informa-
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tion ex-ante (before match creation) about it; these features lead to worker
turnover, with good matches lasting longer.7But it has some important dif-
ferences: the Jovanovic model stresses the structural dependence of the sep-
aration probability on job tenure and market experience. There is growth
of rm-specic capital and of the workers wage over the life cycle. In the
current model the workers do not search themselves and rms do not of-
fer di¤erential rewards to their workers. But the Jovanovic model does not
cater for the key issue here, namely that of worker complementarities.
Burdett, Imai and Wright (2004) analyze models where agents search
for partners to form relationships and may or may not continue searching
for di¤erent partners while matched. Both unmatched and matched agents
have reservation match qualities. A crucial di¤erence with respect to the
current set-up is that they focus on the search decisions of both agents
in a bi-lateral match and stress the idea that if one partner searches the
relationship is less stable, so the other is more inclined to search, potentially
making instability a self-fullling prophecy. They show that this set-up can
generate multiple equilibria. In the current paper we do not allow for the
workers themselves to search but rather focus on the main issue, which is
optimal team formation through search by rms.
6 Discussion of the Model
Our model builds on several strong assumptions regarding technology, wage
determination, search behaviour, etc. We turn now to a brief discussion of
these assumptions in light of the analysis.
One important underlying assumption is that workers are horizontally
but not vertically di¤erentiated. From an ex ante perspective, workers are
identical, while ex post the workers may work more or less well together.
Our assumption reects a view that an interesting part of team formation is
related to horizontal di¤erences, i.e., nding workers who work particularly
well together. Of course nding the correct mix of workers with respect to
productivity (ability, types) is also important. As shown in the literature
review, there exists a substantial literature on vertical worker heterogeneity
and search. We view our contribution as complementary to this literature.
Our second assumption is the use of the Salop circle as the set of possible
7Pissarides (2000, Chapter 6) incorporates this kind of model into the standard DMP
search and matching framework, keeping the matching function and Nash bargaining
ingredients, and postulating a reservation wage and reservation productivity for the worker
and for the rm,respectively.
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worker locations. The main reason why we use the Salop circle is that it
conveniently allow the distances from a given worker to a randomly placed
co-worker to be independent of the workers location. Hence, this modelling
technique readily implies that the workerslocation, ex ante, does not inu-
ence his expected contribution to a team. As already indicated in the text,
this property does not carry over to a location on a line segment. A worker
located close to the middle of the line will on average be closer to randomly
allocated co-workers than a worker located close to the an end point. In ad-
dition, the Salop circle easily captures the notion that if A works well with
B and B with C, then A and C are also likely to work well together. There
may exist other stochastic structures that capture the same type of regu-
larities, but the Salop structure does so in a particularly nice and tractable
way. Note that we could alternatively let output depend positively on the
di¤erence between the workers, in order to capture a love of variety. To
some extent this may be a matter of interpretation of what a good match
is.
As indicated in the text, another representation which qualitatively cap-
tures the same properties are n   1 dimensional spheres in n-dimensional
Euclidean space. With this model formulation, the distribution of distances
of a new worker will be non-linear. More importantly, it may be convenient
to choose a higher-dimensional location space if the number of workers in
the team exceeds 3. In a two-dimensional space, it is not clear which of four
workers are more peripheral. On a two-dimensional sphere, there are ways
to deal with this, for example by dening closeness as the area of a circle on
the sphere that contain all three locations. However, it is beyond the scope
of this paper to explore these issues further.
We assume that wages are independent of match quality. As mentioned
above, this is consistent with a competitive market where rms bid for ex
ante identical workers prior to knowing the match quality. An alternative
formulation would be to allow for bargaining, in which case part of the sur-
plus from a good match would be allocated to the worker. This will give rise
to a hold-up problem, if the rm pays the entire cost of replacing the worker
and only gets a fraction less than one of the return in terms of a better
match. The e¤ect will be equivalent to reducing the circumference with a
fraction equal to the workersbargaining power, and can hence be easily cap-
tured within our framework. The e¤ect will, naturally, be less replacement.
In addition, if the rm is unable to extract the rents going to workers ex
ante through a lower xed wage, this rent will have to be dissipated in some
other way, for instance through unemployment as in Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) and Moen and Rosen (2006). Hence our model in this case may link
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worker replacement to the unemployment level. Furthermore, in the present
version of the model, workers have no incentives to do on-the-job search, as
wages are the same across rms. With wage bargaining, workers may have
an incentive to search for a new job, and bargaining may therefore lead to
on-the-job search.
Throughout we have assumed that the e¢ ciency of a given team stays
constant over time. Although a natural assumption as a starting point,
one may think that the quality of a team may develop over time. As the
workers get to know each other better, their ability to communicate and
collaborate may improve. On the other hand, good relationships may sour
over time. Introducing dynamics of team quality may lead to interesting
hiring patterns. For instance, a rm that has been passive for a while may
start a replacement frenzy if the relationship suddenly sours. This is on our
agenda for future research.
7 Illustrative Simulations: Exploring the Mecha-
nisms
We undertake simulations in order to explore the mechanisms inherent in the
model. This gives a sense of the models implications for worker turnover,
rm age, rm value and the connections between them, revealing rich pat-
terns. In particular, we examine the properties of the resulting rm value
distributions and relate them to replacement policy. The dynamic evolution
of these variables is due to both the random draw of workers and the rms
optimal replacement policy. The interaction of worker draws, exogenous
shocks and rm policy is not trivial and generates non-normal rm value
distributions. We explain the properties of these distributions, as expressed
by their rst four moments, in terms of the mechanisms of the model.
When simulating we look at the full model, with both endogenous and
exogenous replacement and allowing for exogenous rm exit. As in the
previous section, the value function is given by (18). Let  denote the pure
time preference factor, where  = (1   s). This value function can be
found by a xed point algorithm. Appendix D provides full details. When
simulating rms over time, we use the value function formulated above. We
simulate 1000 rms over 30 periods, and repeat it 100 times to eliminate
run-specic e¤ects. In the benchmark case, we set: y = 1; c = 0:01; r = 0:04
(the pure discount rate),  = 0:1; s = 0:1:
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7.1 The Distribution of Firm Values
Plotting the simulated values of (V; 1; 2) space, as in Figure 4, one gets:
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Figure 5: Simulated V; 1; 2
Figure 5 shows the results looking from the NE of Figure 4 towards
the stopping region in the SW, beyond the black cuto¤ line of the optimal
stopping rule 2 (1). The gure shows the concentration of high values
in the stopping region, where the slope is quite steep and where maximum
value is 6.21 with 1 = 2 = 0 and V =
y
r (1 + r)). It also shows the large
dispersion in the low value region at the front of the gure, where the slope
is relatively at. Minimum value is computed numerically to be 2.51 with
1 = 2 = 1=3:In what follows, the latter region will show up as the long tail
of the lower part of the cross-sectional value distribution
7.2 Firm Value and Age
Figures 6 show rm value distributions and their moments by rm age.8
8To construct the distributions of rm value by age we looked for all periods and all
rms, when each particular age was observed. For example, due to the rm exit shock
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Figure 6a: Cross-sectional log rm values, by age
and the entry of new rms, age 1 will be observed not only for all rms in the rst period,
but also in all cases when a rm exogenously left and was replaced by a new entrant. In
this manner we gathered observations of values for all ages, from 1 to 30, and built the
corresponding distributions.
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Figure 6b: Moments of cross-sectional log rms value, by age
The patterns reect the pure process of convergence, disrupted from time
to time by workersexogenous exits, without the entry of new-born rms.
The value of the rm grows with age as a result of team quality improve-
ments, while the standard deviation is rather stable. As rms mature, more
of them enter the absorbing state, with relatively high values, and at the
same time there are always unlucky rms that do not manage to improve
their teams su¢ ciently, or which have been hit by a forced separation shock.
Therefore the distribution becomes more and more skewed over time. Excess
kurtosis uctuates.
These turnover dynamics of the model are very much in line with the
ndings in Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013), whereby, for U.S. rms,
both job creation and job destruction are high for young rms and decline
as rms mature.
We run a regression of the simulation data to further study the connec-
tion between rm value and rm age. Here we look only at a simulated
subsample of rms which have survived until the 30th period. There have
been 45 such rms in our simulation. The estimated equation is:
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ln(V )t = c0 + c1  ln(t) (19)
where ln(V )t is the average logged value of rms at age t, t = 1; 2; :::; 30:
The results are presented in Table 1:
Table 1
The Relation Between Firm Value and Age
Regression Results of Simulated Values
c1 0.05
(0.01)
c0 1.37
(0.02)
R2 0.62
The coe¢ cients are highly signicant and imply a positive relation, il-
lustrated below:
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Figure 7: Predicted rm value (logs) and rm age
Figure 7 shows that overall, despite exogenous separation shocks, rms
tend to increase in value as they mature, due to the improvement of their
teamsquality. This is in line with the ndings of Haltiwanger, Lane and
Spletzer (1999) whereby productivity rises with age for U.S. rms in Census
Bureau data, covering the period 1985-1996.
7.3 The Role of Model Parameters
The core parameters of the model at the benchmark are the worker replace-
ment cost, c = 0:01; the annual rate of interest, r = 0:04; the exogenous
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worker replacement rate,  = 0:1; and the exogenous rm destruction rate,
s = 0:1: In addition, we set the ow output at y = 1. Changes in these
parameters a¤ect the values of the rms both directly, through the value
function and exogenous random events, and indirectly, through adjustments
in the optimal hiring decisions. In what follows we analyze changes in these
core parameters.9
The following patterns emerge:
(i) Increases in the cost of replacement c or in the interest rate r are
illustrated in Figure 8a (and reported in rows 2-6 of Appendix E Table E1).
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Figure 8a: e¤ects of c and r
These two di¤erent increases a¤ect the values distribution similarly: the
mean value goes down, the coe¢ cient of variation goes up, skewness be-
comes more negative and excess kurtosis goes up from negative to positive.
Both higher costs of replacement and costs of time make the rms retain
their teams rather than improve them; rms enter the stopping region more
quickly, with worse teams than before and the mean value goes down.
9Table E1 in Appendix E presents the moments of the log rm value distributions for
the changes in the parameter values analyzed here, relative to their benchmark values.
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As rms tend to stay with their current, randomly-drawn, teams, rm
values become more dispersed. Along the same lines, extreme values become
relatively more frequent and excess kurtosis goes up. As inaction becomes
optimal for so many rms, rms values become more concentrated above
the mean. At the same time, in any period there are always unlucky rms,
which have just obtained a very bad team as a result of the  or s shock.
Hence skewness becomes more negative. The sensitivity to the interest rate
is higher than to changes in replacement costs. Thus, under higher c or
higher r the distribution has a longer left tail, lower mean, and fatter and
longer tails relative to the benchmark.
(ii) Increases in the exogenous worker separation rate  are illustrated
in Figure 8b (and reported in rows 7-9 of Appendix Table E1).
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Figure 8b: e¤ects of  and s
Increased separation depresses the mean value, slightly increases the co-
e¢ cient of variation, make the skewness less negative and kurtosis more
negative. The possibility of a workers exogenous exit is a burden on the
rms, limiting their control over teams and the possibility to improve them.
Hence the decrease in mean value. With optimization repeatedly disrupted
by the shock, less rms are able to achieve the high-value steady state in
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each given period, there are less values concentrated above the mean, and
skewness becomes less negative. Kurtosis becomes more negative as  grows,
implying that the bulk of the dispersion now comes from moderate devia-
tions from the mean. Such a separation shock may hit any rm, occasionally
throwing some rms out of the stopping region, or bringing other rms into
it; the sample becomes more homogenous in terms of values, with extreme
deviations from the mean less frequent, hence the negative excess kurtosis.
(iii) The simulated increases in the exogenous rm destruction rate s; also
shown in Figure 8b, as well as in rows 10-12 in Appendix Table E1, brings the
mean value down, raises the coe¢ cient of variation, and skewness becomes
more negative while kurtosis becomes less negative. As there is a positive
probability for any rm of being closed down in the next period, and due to
the constant inow of new-born rms which have not yet started to improve
their teams, the mean value in the simulated cross-section goes down as s
goes up. The inow of random worker triples increases dispersion drastically,
so the coe¢ cient of variation goes up. As there are less rms in the stopping
region and extreme values become more frequent, excess kurtosis goes up.
The inow of new rms with all kinds of values, including extremely low ones,
makes the left tail of the distribution longer and skewness more negative.
(iv) Going the other way and shutting down exogenous worker separation
and rm destruction,  = s = 0; presented in row 13 of Table E1, has
rms just smoothly converge to the stopping region. Removing exogenous
uncertainty improves the mean value drastically and it is higher than in any
other specication. The coe¢ cient of variation is low, as a result of massive
convergence. Likewise, excess kurtosis is substantially negative. Skewness
is slightly negative as there is no drag on value as a result of some unlucky
rms being hit by a shock or replaced, with all the rms allowed to converge
(and they do so by period 30).
To sum up, each of the parameters above has an impact on the process
of convergence into the stopping region. The factors that facilitate stop-
ping, such as high c and r or low  produce higher concentration of rms
in the stopping region and therefore make skewness more negative. The
replacement of old rms by new ones does not impact the process of conver-
gence directly. It adds new triples everywhere, thereby lengthening the left
tail of the distribution and adding more extreme values skewness becomes
more negative and excess kurtosis goes up. The factors that impede rms,
namely high c; high r, high  or high s decrease mean rm value. The
factors that make the rms stop quickly wherever they are (high c or r), or
add new triples exogenously, such as high s; make values more dispersed,
distribution tails fatter, and excess kurtosis higher.
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8 Conclusions
The paper has characterized the rm in its role as a coordinating device.
Thus, output depends on the interactions between workers, with comple-
mentarities playing a key role. The paper has derived optimal policy, us-
ing a threshold on a state variable and allowing for endogenous hiring and
ring. Firm value emerges from optimal coordination done in this man-
ner and uctuates as the quality of the interaction between the workers
changes. Simulations of the model generate non-normal rm value distribu-
tions, with negative skewness and negative excess kurtosis. These moments
reect worker turnover dynamics, whereby a large mass of rms is inactive
in replacement, having attained good team formation, while exogenous re-
placement and rm exit induce dispersion of rms in the region of lower
value. Future work will examine alternative production functions, learning
and training processes, and wage-setting mechanisms within this set-up.
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9 Appendix A. Solution of the Cut-O¤ 
In this Appendix we show how to derive : We repeat the cut-o¤ equation
for convenience
c+
1
2
+
21
2
  1   22 = 212 + 2
2
2
r
(20)
If 2 = 0, the left-hand side of (20) is strictly positive while the right-
hand side is zero (since 1  1=3 by construction). As 2 !1, the left-hand
side goes to minus innity and the right-hand side to plus innity. Hence
we know that the equation has a solution. Since the left-hand side is strictly
decreasing and the right-hand side strictly increasing in 2, we know that
the solution is unique.
In the text we have already shown that 2(1); if it exists, is decreasing
in 1. It follows that  can be obtained by inserting 2 = 1 =  in (20).
This gives
c+
1
2
+
2
2
     2 = 2
 + 22
r
(21)
Hence  is the unique positive root to the second order equation
c+
1
2
  2 8  r
2r
  3 = 0 (22)
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10 Appendix B. Derivation of Equation (15)
Substituting (11) into (14) gives
y   2(1 + 2(1))
r
(1 + r) + c = y   (1
2
+ 1 +
21
2
) (23)
+
(1 + 22)(y   2(1 + 2)) + 222 + 212
r
+(1  1   22)y   2(1 + 2(1))
r
Collecting all terms containing y  2(1+ 2(1)) on the left-hand side gives
y   2(1 + 2(1))
r
[1 + r   (1 + 22)  (1  (1 + 22))] + c  y(24)
=  (1
2
+ 1 +
21
2
) +
2
2
2 + 212
r
which simplies to
 2(1 + 2(1)) + c =  (1
2
+ 1 +
21
2
) +
2
2
2 + 212
r
(25)
Collecting terms gives
c+
1
2
+
21
2
  1   22(1) = 2
2
2 + 212
r
(26)
which is equation (15).
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11 Appendix C. Proof of Existence of Equilibrium
Dene
V  Ej12V (1; 2; 0; ey; c)
Given our assumption that the rm always produces until it is destroyed, it
follows that
Ej12V (1; 2;w; ey; c) = V   W
r0
(27)
where r0 = r=(1 + r) and where, as above, W = 3w. By assumption, V > 0
(see below). It follows that there exists a unique W that solves the zero-
prot condition given by
V   W
r0
= K (28)
The solution is given by W = r0(V  K):
We will give conditions on parameters that ensure that V > 0;and that
rms, if entering, will produce even after the worst possible draws. The
supremum of per-period output is ey (obtained with 1 = 2 = 0). It follows
that
V <
ey
r0
Suppose
K >
4
3
1
r0
(29)
From the zero prot condition it then follows that
W = r0(V  K) < ey   4=3 (30)
The inmum of per period prot is inf = ey   4=3   W (obtained when
1 = 2 = 1=3). From (30) it follows that
inf = ey   4=3 W > 0 (31)
Hence a su¢ cient condition for rms to operate after the lowest possible
draws is that (29) is satised.
We assume that the lower bound on wages is that W  0. To ensure
that V > K, note that
V >
ey   4=3
r0
since ey   4=3 is the lowest per period output and a rm can always choose
not to replace. Entry occurs in equilibrium if and only if it is protable to
enter when W = 0. Hence a su¢ cient condition for entry to occur i is thatey 4=3
r0 > K or that ey  r0K + 4=3 (tighter bounds can also be found).
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12 Appendix D. The Simulation Methodology
The entire simulation is run in Matlab with 100 iterations. In order to
account for the variability of simulation output from iteration to iteration,
we report the average and the standard deviation of the moments and the
probability density functions, as obtained in 100 iterations.
Calculating the Value Function
We nd the value function V numerically for the discretized space (1; 2),
using a xed-point procedure. First we guess the initial value for V in
each and every point of this two-dimensional space; we then mechanically
go over all possible events (exit, in which case the value turns zero, forced
or voluntary separation, with the subsequent draw of the third worker) to
calculate the expected value in the next period, derive the optimal decision
at each point (1; 2), given the initial guess V; and thus compute the RHS
of the value function equation below:
V (1:2) = (1; 2)+
"
s  0 + (1  s) 
 
 
h
E 
F
V (01; 
0
2)  c
i
+(1  )  Emax[V (1; 2); E V (01; 
0
2)  c]
!#
(32)
Next, we dene the RHS found above as our new V and repeat the
calculations above. We iterate on this procedure till the stage when the
discrepancy between the V on the LHS and the RHS is less than the pre-set
tolerance level.
The mechanical steps of the program are the following:
1. We assume that each of 1; 2 can take only a nite number of values
between 0 and 1. We call this number of values BINS_NUMBER and it
may be changed in the program.
2. However, not all the pairs (1; 2) are possible, as by denition 2 
1 and 2  12   12 (the latter ensures that the distances are measured
correctlyalong the circle). We impose the above restriction on the pairs
constructed earlier, and so obtain a smaller number of pairs, all of which
are feasible. Note that all the distances in the pairs are proportionate to
1/BINS_NUMBER
3. In fact, the expected value of forced and voluntary replacement,
Eq
F
V (01; 
0
2) and EV
q(
0
1; 
0
2), di¤er in only one respect: when the replace-
ment is voluntary, two remaining workers are those with 1 between them,
whereas when the replacement is forced, it might be any of the three: 1; 2
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or min(( 1 + 2); 1   ( 1 + 2)), with equal probabilities. In the general
case, if there are two workers at a distance , and the third worker is drawn
randomly, possible pairs in the following period may be of the following
three types: (i)  turns out to be the smaller distance (the third worker falls
relatively far outside the arch), (ii)  turns out to be the bigger distance
(the third worker falls outside the arch, but relatively close) (iii) the third
worker falls inside the arch, in which case the sum of the distances in the
next period is . In the simulation we go over all possible pairs to identify
the pairs that conform with (i)-(iii). Note that because all the distances are
proportionate to 1/BINS_NUMBER, it is easy to identify the pairs of the
type (iii) described above. This can be done for any , whether it is 1; 2
or min(( 1 + 2); 1  ( 1 + 2))
4. Having the guess V , and given that all possible pairs are equally prob-
able, we are then able to calculate the expected values of the rm when cur-
rently there are two workers at a distance . Call this value EV (). Then, if
there is a rm with three workers with distances (1:2), the expected value
of voluntary replacement is EV (1), and expected value of forced replace-
ment is 1=3EV (1)+1=3EV (2)+1=3EV (min((1 + 2); 1  (1 + 2))) :
Thus we are able to calculate the RHS of equation ( 32) above and compare
it to the initial guess V .
We iterate the process till the biggest quadratic di¤erence in the values
of LHS and RHS, over the pairs (1; 2); of equation (32) is less than the
tolerance level, which was set at 0.0000001.
Dynamic Simulations
Once the value function is found for all possible points on the grid, the
simulation is run as follows.
1. The number of rms (N) and the number of periods (T ) is dened.
We use N = 1000; T = 30:
2. For each rm, three numbers are drawn randomly from a uniform
distribution U [0; 1] using the Matlab function unifrnd.
3. The distances between the numbers are calculated, the middle worker
is dened, and as a result, for each rm a vector (1; 2) is found.
4. For each rm, the actual vector (1; 2) is replaced by the closest point
on the grid found above
e1;e2 :
40
5. According to
e1;e2, using the calculations from previous section, we
assign to each rm the value and the optimal decision in the current
period.
6. It is determined whether an exit shock hits. If it does, instead of the
current distances of the rm, a new triple is drawn in the next period.
If it does not, it is determined whether a forced separation shock 
hits. If  hits, a corresponding worker is replaced by a new draw and
distances are recalculated in the next period. If it does not, and it
is optimal not to replace, the distances are preserved for the rm in
the next period, as well as the value. If it is optimal to replace, the
worst worker is replaced by a new one, distances are re-calculated in
the next period, together with the value.
Steps 4-6 are repeated for each rm over all periods.
As a result, we have a T by N matrix of rm values. The whole process
is iterated 100 times to eliminate run-specic e¤ects. We also record the
events history, in a T by N matrix which assigns a value of 0 if a particular
rm was inactive in a particular period,1 if it replaced voluntarily, 2 if it was
forced to replace, and 3 if it was hit by an exit shock and ceased to exist
from the next period on. We use this matrix to di¤erentiate rms by states
and to calculate rmsages.
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13 Appendix E. Changes in Parameters
Table E1
The E¤ects of Changes in Parameters
Parameters Moments of ln(V) in period 30
c r  s mean coef. of var. skewness excess kurtosis
1 0:01 0:04 0:1 0:1 1:46 0:13  0:47  0:40
2 0:05  10     1:45 0:14  0:55  0:28
3 0:10       1:44 0:16  0:68 0:06
4   0:01     1:60 0:10  0:39  0:53
5   0:04     1:46 0:13  0:47  0:40
6   0:10     1:15 0:20  0:72 0:02
7     0   1:73 0:11  0:67  0:04
8     0:05   1:58 0:12  0:58  0:27
9     0:15   1:46 0:13  0:41  0:48
10       0 2:82 0:02  0:21  0:52
11       0:05 1:86 0:07  0:41  0:40
12       0:15 1:09 0:22  0:53  0:32
13     0 0 3:11 0:02  0:12  0:49
The implications of these changes are discussed in sub-section 5.5.
10As in the benchmark, row 1.
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